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CASE NOTE
Products Liability—Application of State Long-Arm Statute to Suits
for Injuries Caused by Negligent Foreign Manufacture—Duple
Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth. 1—Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd.
the defendant-appellant, was an English manufacturer of motor coach
bodies. All of Duple's manufacturing was done in England, and the
company had no offices or representatives in the United States. Duple
received an order from Vauxhall, Ltd., another English company, to
build a number of coach bodies to be placed on Vauxhall chassis. The
coach bodies were designed and manufactured by Duple with the
knowledge that they were to be used in Hawaii and were constructed
with modifications for use there. The completed bodies were placed on
the chassis, shipped by Duple to Vauxhall, and then delivered in Hawaii
to Haleakala Motors which, in turn, sold the buses to Maui Island
Tours. The plaintiff-appellees alleged that they had been injured due
to Duple's negligent manufacture of a coach owned by Maui Island
Tours which overturned while the plaintiffs were passengers. In an
action brought in the United States. District Court for the District of
Hawaii, the court concluded that Duple was personally subject to the
court's jurisdiction through the application of Hawaii's "long-arm"
statute.' The district court denied Duple's motions to dismiss for
want of jurisdiction and to quash return of service of the summons!'
From this judgment, Duple took an interlocutory appeal4
 which chal-
lenged the in personam jurisdiction of the district court.
On appeal from denial of its motion to dismiss for lack of juris-
diction, Duple first argued that since the alleged negligent manufac-
ture took place wholly in England, there was no "tortious act" com-
mitted in Hawaii and, therefore, Hawaii's long-arm statute was not
applicable. Secondly, Duple contended that the requirements of due
process prevented Hawaii from asserting in personam jurisdiction in
1 Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969).
2 Id. at 234. This statute provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in
person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby
submits his person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the ju-
risdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the
doing of any of the acts:
• . . (b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
. . . (2) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of this State, as provided in this section, may be made by
serving the summons upon the defendant outside this State, as provided in section
230-33, with the same force and effect as though summons had been personally
served within this State.
Hawaii Rev. Laws § 230-415 (Supp. 1965).
3 417 F.2d at 232, n.1.
4
 Id. The appeal was taken pursuant to an order of the court of appeals under 28
§ 1292 (b) (1964) .
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the present case. On Duple's interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals
HELD: Negligent manufacture outside Hawaii which gives rise to an
injury within that state is a tortious act within the meaning of Hawaii's
long-arm statute. Furthermore, the presence of coach bodies in Hawaii,
manufactured with the knowledge that they would be delivered to and
used there, satisfies due process requirements for Hawaiian in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the manufacturer.
That a tortious act within the terms of Hawaii's long-arm statute
includes injuries caused by acts committed outside the state appears
to be well settled. The Hawaii statute was modeled upon an Illinois
statute," which had been clarified through the decision in Gray v. Amer-
ican Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.° as applicable to injuries
caused by negligence arising outside the state. On this basis, the
court's rejection of Duple's argument that the Hawaiian statute did
not apply seems correct. However, the Duple court's resolution of the
issue of due process standards of exercising jurisdiction is less satis-
factory. It is submitted that, while the court in Duple correctly inter-
preted the presently available Supreme Court rulings as to the due
process requirements of in personam jurisdiction, the court's strict
adherence to these domestic, interstate standards was ill-advised in
the international situation which was presented in Duple.
The constitutional limitations of a state court's in personam
jurisdiction have been liberalized through a series of Supreme Court
decisions.' In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 8 the Court upheld
Washington jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which had em-
ployed salesmen and solicited orders within that state. In affirming
the application of the Washington Unemployment Compensation Act°
requiring corporations doing business within the state to contribute to
state unemployment funds, the Court held that in personam jurisdic-
tion meets due process requirements if the out of state defendant has
"certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the main-
tenance of the suit does not 'offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice'!" The Court noted that due process is satis-
fied when the "contacts" between a defendant and a state have been
"continuous and systematic."' The Court expressly disclaimed, how-
ever, any attempt to measure due process standards quantitatively."
The test for compliance with due process was instead described as
requiring an examination of the nature and quality of the foreign cor-
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 17 (1959).
6 22 III. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
For a full discussion of the liberalization of the limits placed upon state in per-
sonam jurisdiction see Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process 'Clause and the In
Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569 (1958).
8 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Wash. Rev. Stat. § 9998-103a-123a (Supp. 1941).
10 326 U.S. at 316.
11 Id. at 317.
12 Id. at 319.
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poration's contacts with the forum state in light of the state's need for
the orderly administration of its laws."
The minimum contacts test that was enunciated in International
Shoe was further refined in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co."
In McGee, it was contended that the California state courts had juris-
diction over an insurance contract dispute involving an Arizona cor-
poration whose only contact with California was the issuance of the
policy in dispute." The Supreme Court, after noting the expanded
scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations, held that the
"substantial connection" represented by the disputed contract was in
itself enough to satisfy due process requirements for in personam juris-
diction." This result appeared to extend substantially the scope of
state jurisdiction by moving from the broad balancing test presented
in International Shoe to a more objective standard based upon a sin-
gle contact." However, such a liberalization of jurisdictional require-
ments must be evaluated in light of the later language in Hanson v.
Denckla,' which held that the courts of Florida did not have jurisdic-
tion in a dispute over a trust which had been created in another state
between out of state parties. The Court held that neither the subse-
quent residency of the settlors and beneficiaries in Florida," nor the
execution of the contested powers of appointment in Florida,' gave
that state in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident trustees. The
Court in Hanson noted that a state cannot submit an out of state
defendant to its jurisdiction unless ". . • there be some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State.. .."21
The Duple court reviewed these requirements of due process and
found them satisfied when an allegedly defective product was present
in the forum state after having been manufactured with the knowl-
edge that the product would be used in that state." In so holding, the
court adopted the rationale expressed in Keckler v. Brookwood Coun-
try Club.22 In Keckler, the court upheld Illinois jurisdiction over an
Indiana corporation which had manufactured and sold a golf cart in
Indiana. The cart was later delivered to Illinois where personal in-
juries were sustained because of an alleged defect in the cart. The
Keckler court held that due process standards of fairness were met
since a manufacturer who sells his product with the knowledge that
18 Id.
14 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
15 Id. at 221-22.
16 Id. at 223.
17 Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers In Product
Liability Actions, 63 Mich. L. Rev. 1028, 1029 (1965).
18
 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
19 Id. at 254.
Id. at 253.
201 Id.
22 417 F.2d at 235.
23 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1965), cited In 417 F.2d at 235, n.8.
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it will be resold from dealer to dealer in an interstate transaction can-
not claim surprise at being held to answer in any state for damage
caused by his product.' If the distributing volume of his product
supports a reasonable inference that "national channels of commerce""
have been chosen, he cannot deny the interest of the state where the
injury occurred in providing a forum. Following the holding in Keckler,
such a manufacturer ". . . not only submits himself to jurisdiction in
all states where his product causes injury but also to the law of those
states.""
An essential element, however, in the "affirmative act" rationale
expressed in Hanson and expanded in Keckler is the fluidity of the
present day American commercial market. This economic structure
was emphasized in McGee in the Court's enumeration of factors such
as transportation, communication and mail services as contributing to
the fairness of extending jurisdiction to out of state manufacturers."
It is doubtful that this same closely-knit economic community is to be
found in the international market." Nevertheless, the majority in
Duple dismissed without discussion the problem of the practical appli-
cation of a domestic standard in an international economic context."
Such a strict application of the Hanson and Keckler rationale without
a reconciliation of the economic factors underlying those decisions
with international market practices would seem to be an unfair exten-
tion of the liberalized jurisdictional rule to a foreign defendant. How-
ever, the court in Duple departed from a strict economic approach by
stressing the fact of Duple's actual knowledge that its product was to
be used in Hawaii." To the extent that Duple does apply an interstate
jurisdictional standard, however, the decision raises the question of
the propriety of this standard in the international sphere.
A threshold question in any instance of a state asserting juris-
diction over a foreigner is whether the state's activity intrudes upon
an area of national policy reserved exclusively for federal action. As
the dissent in Duple points out, a state may not extend its jurisdiction
in a manner that would adversely affect international relations." How-
24 Id. at 649.
25 Id. at 650. The Fifth Circuit has adopted a "stream of commerce theory" which
is patterned after the "channels of commerce" approach used in Keckler. See Eyerly
Aircraft v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 1969). The most recent application of
the "stream of commerce" theory was in Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 411 F.2d 1189
(5th Cir. 1970), which upheld Texas jurisdiction over an out of state television manufac-
turer who had no place of business within the state, and who sold T.V. sets only on a
wholesale basis to Sears. The court held that the presence of TN, sets in Texas, coupled
with the manufacturer's knowledge that Sears had been reselling the manufacturer's sets
in Texas, was sufficient contact to submit the manufacturer to Texas jurisdiction for
injuries caused in that state. 411 F.2d at 1189.
26 248 F. Supp. at 650.
27 355 U.S. at 223.
28 417 F.2d at 239 (dissenting opinion),
20 Id. at 236.
a° Id. at 234.
31 Id, at 239 (dissenting opinion).
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ever, the holding in Duple does not involve such a direct impact upon
foreign affairs." The Duple court's extension of jurisdiction to cover
foreign manufacturers whose negligence has resulted in injuries within
the state itself falls far short of an improper attempt of a state to
"establish its own foreign policy!"33
 This type of state activity, aimed
only at protecting its citizens from injuries due to defective products,
is not an improper attempt by a state to alter national foreign policy
to suit the policies of the state." The effect of such a ruling would
appear to be within the appropriate limits of state activity which may
have "some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries!'" Thus,
the holding in Duple does not so directly affect foreign affairs that
the jurisdictional issue should have been reached as a matter of na-
tional policy" rather than by unilateral state judicial action.
Establishing the constitutional validity of the Duple holding, how-
ever, does not resolve the question of whether a foreign manufacturer
should be required to defend in the United States in the Duple situ-
ation. A decision to impose jurisdiction upon a foreign defendant must
take into consideration the problems of recovering upon a judgment
rendered against the foreigner. While the Full Faith and Credit Clause
requires that a judgment of one state be honored in the courts of an-
other state," no such certainty attends the judgments of the courts of
the United States in a foreign country. The recognition of an American
judgment by a foreign court depends in part upon considerations of
international duty and convenience." These principles of comity were
developed to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction." Mile comity is largely a
rule of practice," the ultimate recognition of another country's judg-
ment is an extension of the res judicata effect of the judgment itself
to the territory of the forum nation "applied to!'" Recognition of a
judgment by a foreign court rests primarily upon the determination
by the foreign court that the rendering court had proper jurisdiction."
However, in making this determination the forum utilizes the full dis-
cretion of its sovereign powers," and may refuse enforcement of a
82 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) for an example of such a direct im-
pact.
83 389 U.S. at 441.
84 Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners, 276 A.C.A. 266, 274 80 Cal.
Rptr. 800, 801 (1969).
85 Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947).
36 417 F.2d at 239 (dissenting opinion).
87 Reese, The Status In This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad,. 50 Colum.
L. Rev. 783 (1950).
88
 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). 	 •
30
 Fantony v. Fantony, 21 N.J. 525, 533, 122 A.2d 594, 597 (1956). 
40 Johnston v. Compagnie Ginirale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381,' 38 .7; 152 N.E.
121, 123 (1926).
41 Nussbaum, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments, 41 Colum: L.. Rev; 221, 222
(1941).
42 Id. at 22. See also Schibsby v. Westenholz, L.R. 6 Q.B. 155 (1870).
48
 Nussbaum, supra note 41 at 223.
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jurisdictionally valid foreign judgment that markedly departs from
notions of fairness or public policy of the forum 44
The probability of a British court granting comity and enforcing
a judgment on the Duple facts was considered remote by the dissent
in Duple because of the minimal contacts between the defendant and
the Hawaiian court." However, the attitude of British courts toward
American judgments does not support the dissent's conclusion. In
British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd.,"
an American company awarded patent rights to a British company,
which, in turn, awarded exclusive licensing privileges to another British
company. The original patent contract was then held to be in violation
of the Sherman Act' by an American court." The American court
issued an order requiring that the initial patent be reconveyed. The
action in British Nylon was brought by the English licensee to prevent
the English licensor from obeying the American order to reconvey.
The court in British Nylon held that the American judgment would
not be honored, and upheld an injunction granted against reconveyance
of the patent." In so holding, the court noted that the American court
had attempted to regulate the internal contractual affairs of a British
company which was not a party to the American proceedings." How-
ever, the opinion in British Nylon points out that foreign judgments,
even if they affect British trade, would generally be honored if the
action arose ". . . between persons who are either nationals or sub-
jects of that country or are otherwise subject to its jurisdiction." 51 In
Duple, the fact that the foreign defendant knew of the intended destina-
tion and use of his product52 provides grounds for jurisdiction over a
defendant "otherwise" beyond reach.
The decision in- Duple, grounded upon domestic due process re-
quirements as the basis for jurisdiction, would therefore support an
enforceable judgment. In the- international situation, however, this
approach should not be applied without flexibility. One alternative
available in cases such as Duple is the possible application of the
rule of forum non conveniens. This doctrine permits a court to decline
to entertain a case, appropriately flied under prevailing rules of com-
petence, if the court is an extremely inconvenient forum for presenta-
tion of the action." Through this doctrine, which is purely discre-
44 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 T.J.S. 398, 449 (1964)
40 417 F.2d at 239 (dissenting opinion).
4° 2 All E.R. 780 (1952).
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
48 United States v. Imperial Chemical Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1952).
40 2 All E.R. at 783-784.
60 Id. at 782.
Id.
02 417 F.2d at 235.
83 Ginsberg, The Competent Court In Private International Law: Some Observa-
tions On Current Views In The United States, 20 Rutgers L. Rev, 89, 98 (1965).
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tionary," a court may resist imposition of its jurisdiction, even though
it has power to hear the case, if it feels it is an inappropriate forum
for trial." The suitability of a particular court rests upon a considera-
tion of factors such as access to proof, availability of compulsory
process to obtain the attendance of unwilling witnesses, the cost of
obtaining the attendance of witnesses, and all of the other problems
that make the trial expeditious and inexpensive."
Forum non conveniens will not be applied, however, unless an
appropriate forum is available to the plaintiff." Thus, while forum non
conveniens remains a viable doctrine when the alternative forum falls
outside the United States, it has been described as a harsh rule and
courts have rarely applied it58 because they must dismiss rather than
transfer the action. In Burt v. Isthmus Development Co.," it was
stated that a court should require positive evidence of extreme cir-
cumstances and should be convinced that material injustice will occur
"before it denies a citizen access to the courts of this country."'
Similarly, in Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co.," the court
stated that although an American citizen does not have an absolute
right to sue in an American court," where application of forum non
conveniens would limit redress to a foreign court, American courts are
reluctant to force United States citizens to appear in a foreign forum."
This reluctance, however, should not foreclose investigation of
possible grounds for application of the doctrine. The use of forum
non conveniens offers a means to avoid unfairness in actions com-
menced in a competent but inappropriate forum." As the dissent in
Duple points out, there were other local defendants in Duple who were
available and amenable to suit." The Duple court could have tempered
its strict application of jurisdictional standards with a consideration
of the availability of these other defendants in addition to its finding
that basic due process requirements had been met. Particularly in such
an international situation, it would not be unreasonable for a court
to require that a plaintiff demonstrate some justification for inconven-
iencing one defendant among several that are available." This more
flexible approach would help to eliminate any unfairness that might
exist notwithstanding compliance with due process guarantees.
54 Comment, Judicially Enacted Direct Action Statutes; Soundness of the New
York Rule, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 711, 724 (1969).
55 Ginsberg, supra note 53, at 98.
Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro do Sul, S.A. (Cruzeiro), 232 F. Supp. 433,
442 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
57 Ginsberg, supra note 53, at 98.
58 232 F. Supp. at 443.
5D 218 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955).
6° Id. at 357.
61 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956) .
62 Id. at 645.
63 Id. at 646.
84 Ginsberg, supra note 53, at 98.
65 417 F.2d at 238 (dissenting opinion).
08 Ginsberg, supra note 53, at 100.
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In conclusion, it is submitted that the court in Duple correctly
interpreted presently available due process standards in its determina-
tion of the extent of its jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers for
injuries caused by their defective products. The additional factor that
the defendant had actual knowledge of where his product would be
used further supports the court's finding. However, it is suggested that
the due process standard applied in Duple should not be solely deter-
minative of jurisdictional questions in an international situation. The
use of these domestically developed standards could be profitably
joined with the exercise of the court's discretion in avoiding unneces-
sary hardship through resort to the doctrine of f arum non conveniens.
DANIEL H. LIDMAN
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